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The ALI's Complex Litigation Project and 
Federal-To-State Consolidation: A Due Process 
Analysis of Granting to State Courts Nationwide 
Personal Jurisdiction 
In response to the ever increasing burdens placed on the 
judicial system by multiforum litigation involving multiple 
parties, the American Law Institute ("ALI") has drafted and 
proposed the enactment of a national complex litigation statute 
(hereinafter the "Proposal"). The Proposal addresses the prob- 
lems created by multiparty, multiforum litigation-particularly 
the costs and inefficiencies created by the relitigation of 
common issues-through mechanisms which transfer all relat- 
ed litigation to a single forum.' The transfer of related litiga- 
tion to a single federal forum (i.e., state-to-federal and federal- 
to-federal consolidation) is at  the core of the Proposal; 
nevertheless, the Proposal also includes a mechanism for the 
transfer of related litigation to the proper court of a single 
state (federal-to-state   on solid at ion).^ To facilitate state court 
consolidation, the Proposal confers broad powers on state 
transferee courts. Most notable among these powers are the 
authority to exert jurisdiction "to the full extent of the power 
conferrable on a federal court under the United States 
Constitution" and the power to exercise nationwide service of 
p ro~ess .~  This expansion of the territorial jurisdiction 
exercisable by state courts probably violates the requirements 
of due process, but remains a useful mechanism for reducing 
judicial inefficiency.' This paper focuses on the due process 
1. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT: STATUTORY 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS, chs. 4, 5, and 6. (1994) [hereinafter COMPLEX 
LITIGATION PROPOSAL]. 
2. The American Law Institute has also suggested the formulation of an 
Interstate Complex Litigation Compact or a Uniform Complex Litigation Act which 
would be "designed to facilitate the transfer and consolidation in one state court of 
similar actions lodged in the courts of two or more states." COMPLEX LITIGATION 
PROPOSAL, supra note 1, 5 4.02 ch. 4 Introductory Note (a) a t  166. 
3. Id. 8 3.08 (a) a t  147 (emphasis added). 
4. The ALI's provision for federal-to-state transfers of multiparty, multiforum 
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concerns implicated by the Proposal's enlargement of state 
court jurisdiction. 
Part I1 of this paper outlines the general structure of the 
federal-to-state transfer mechanism of the Proposal. This part 
considers the Proposal's provisions for enlarging the territorial 
jurisdiction of state courts and providing them with the power 
to serve process nationwide. Part I11 addresses the 
constitutionality of the Proposal's expansion of the territorial 
jurisdiction of state courts. Finally, Part IV explores the utility 
of providing a mechanism for federal-to-state consolidation 
within the confines of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 
State courts currently manage and adjudicate an immense 
(and continually increasing) number of multiparty, multiforum 
cases.5 Section 4.01 was drafted to fill "a gapv6 in the 
Proposal's scheme for single-forum consolidation: the lack of a 
procedure "for moving cases from the federal to the state courts 
in situations involving both state and federal lawsuits when a 
state court may be the preferable forum for the adjudication of 
a complex di~pute."~ The Proposal, however, states that this 
consolidation to state courts should only be used "under certain 
very limited ~ircumstances."~ Initially this part of the paper 
will set forth the parameters of these "very limited 
circ~mstances."~ The specific provisions for enlarging the 
territorial jurisdiction of state courts and providing them with 
the power of nationwide service of process will then be 
examined. 
litigation poses numerous other constitutional questions such as: do federal-to-state 
transfers violate the Tenth Amendment or Article I11 of the Constitution?; do such 
transfers inappropriately curtail the jurisdiction of the federal courts?; and do such 
transfers violate the equal protection principles of the Fifth Amendment by treating 
multiforum cases with multiple parties different from other cases? For a general 
exploration of these issues, see Joan Steinman, Reverse Removal, 78 IOWA L. REV. 
1029 (1993). 
5. Asbestos litigation is one of the better-known illustrations of this 
development. Of the 17,120 asbestos exposure cases pending against Johns- 
Mansville a t  the time of its filing for bankruptcy, approximately two-thirds of the 
cases (11,143) had been brought in state rather than federal court. Parish, Asbestos 
Litigation-Dimensions of the Problem, STATE CT. J., Winter 1984, a t  5. 
6. COMPLEX L~GATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, a t  166. 
7. Id. at  165. 
8. Id. at 166. 
9. Id. at  220. 
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A. Designation of a State Court as a Transferee Forum 
Section 4.01(a) delineates the Proposal's requisites for 
federal-to-state transfers: 
Subject to the exceptions in subsection (c), when deter- 
mining under 8 3.04 where to transfer and consolidate ac- 
tions, the Complex Litigation Panel" may designate a state 
court as the transferee court if the Panel determines 
(1) that the events giving rise to the controversy are 
centered in a single state and a significant portion of the 
existing litigation is lodged in the courts of that state; 
(2) that fairness to the parties and the interests of justice 
will be materially advanced by transfer and consolidation of 
the federal actians with other suits pending in the state court; 
and 
(3) that the state court is more appropriate than other 
possible transferee courts." 
These federal-to-state transfer conditions are most likely to 
be present in the narrow range of multiparty, multiforum liti- 
gation which arises from area pollution, insurance coverage, 
and "single disaster" events such as the 1981 catastrophic col- 
lapse of the Hyatt Skywalk in Kansas City." According to the 
Proposal, these types of litigation lend themselves particularly 
well to adjudication in state courts.13 
Subsection (a) further requires the "consent of the appro- 
priate judicial authority in the state in which the designated 
transferee court is located."" This requirement is an attempt 
to address federalism concerns raised by the transfer of litiga- 
tion from a federal forum to a state court. Such a transfer could 
be perceived as forcing yet another federal matter upon the 
meager resources of the state judicial  system^.'^ 
In subsection (b) of section 4.01, the Proposal lists the 
factors that the Complex Litigation Panel should consider in 
determining whether the requirements of subsection (a) (other 
10. The AL17s Proposal contemplates the establishment of a Complex Litiga- 
tion Panel of federal judges that would be given the responsibility of deciding 
whether separate civil actions that involve common questions of fact should be 
consolidated for pretrial proceedings, trial, or both. The Panel would also eventual- 
ly choose the forum for the proceedings. See id. at 437-53. 
11. Id. at 177 (footnote added). 
12. Id. at 168. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 4 4.01(a) at 178. 
15. Id. note (d) to Chapter 4, at 174. 
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than the consent requirement) have been met. The factors 
listed in subsection (b) are: 
(1) the number of the individual cases that initially were 
filed or are pending in state courts relative to the number of 
actions pending in federal courts; 
(2) the number of states in which the state and federal 
cases are located; 
(3) whether the procedures or law to be applied in the 
state transferee court differ from that which would have been 
applied by a federal transferee court to a sufficient degree 
that designation of the state transferee court creates a risk of 
prejudice to some of the parties to be transferred there; and 
(4) any other factor indicating the need to accommodate a 
particular state or federal interest.16 
Factors (1) and (2) address whether related cases are concen- 
trated in the state court system of a particular state (judicial 
and geographic concentration) while factors (3) and (4) look at 
issues of fairness. 
Even if the conditions of section 4.01(a) are met, some 
kinds of federal cases are not subject to the Complex Litigation 
Panel's authority to transfer cases. Subsection (c) of sec- 
tion 4.01 exempts from transfer to a state court: (one) any 
action that is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
courts; (two) any action that has been removed to a federal 
court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 5 1441(d), 28 U.S.C. 
5 1442, or 28 U.S.C. 5 1443; (three) any action brought in feder- 
al court under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 5 1983; and (four) 
any action brought by the United States under 28 U.S.C. 
5 1345 or removed by it under 28 U.S.C. 5 1444.17 These ac- 
tions were excluded from transfer to state court because they 
embrace "areas in which Congress has expressed an interest in 
assuring that a federal forum be available."18 Hence, the 
government's and the parties' substantial interests in securing 
a federal forum are allowed to predominate. 
B. Personal Jurisdiction in the State Transferee Court 
In addition to delineating the necessary conditions for 
federal-to-state transfer, section 4.01(a) also, through the incor- 
16. Id. § 4.01(b) at 178. 
17. Id. 5 4.01(c) at 178. 
18. Id. 8 4.01 cmt. g at 195. 
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poration of other sections of the Proposal, confers various pow- 
ers on state transferee courts. Specifically, section 4.01(a) pro- 
vides that "[olnce transfer is approved, a state transferee court 
shall have the same powers and responsibilities as a federal 
transferee court under sections 3.06(c), 3.08, 5.03 and 5 .04."19 
Addressing the personal jurisdictional power of the trans- 
feree court, section 3.08 states: 
(a) Once actions have been transferred and consolidated 
by the Complex Litigation Panel, the transferee court may 
exercise jurisdiction over any parties to those actions or any 
parties2' later joined to the consolidated proceeding to the 
h l l  extent of the power conferrable on a federal court under 
the United States Constitution. 
(b) Once actions have been transferred and consolidated 
by the Complex Litigation Panel, a subpoena for attendance 
at a hearing or trial, if authorized by the transferee court 
upon motion for good cause shown and upon such terms and 
conditions as the court may impose, may be served at any 
place within the jurisdiction of the United States or anywhere 
outside the United States if not otherwise prohibited by 
law.21 
19. Id. $ 4.01(a) a t  178. Discussion of the powers conferred by $5 3.06, 5.03, 
and 5.04 is outside the scope of this paper. As a general matter, $ 3.06(c) discuss- 
es the discretion that the transferee court has when it severs issues, id. $ 3.06 (c) 
at 114-15. Section 5.03 addresses supplemental jurisdiction, id. $ 5.03 a t  256-57, 
and $ 5.04 confers upon transferee courts the power to enjoin transactionally re- 
lated proceedings pending in other state or federal courts, id. $ 5.04 at  263. 
20. Due process analysis of the exercise of personal jurisdiction has, for the 
most part, focused on jurisdiction over defendants. But see Phillips Petroleum Co. 
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) for an analysis of the personal jurisdictional require- 
ments imposed when potential members of the plaintiff class in a class action are 
absent. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff is rarely an issue because plaintiffs are con- 
sidered to have impliedly consented to jurisdiction by selecting the particular fo- 
rum. See Adams v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938). As is recognized by the 
Proposal, however, "In many complex litigation situations under this proposal, nei- 
ther the plaintiff nor the defendant will have selected the transferee forum." COM- 
PLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, $ 3.08 cmt. a a t  148. The Proposal there- 
fore concludes that "whether the transferee court has the power to enter a binding 
judgment should be determined by a standard applicable to all the parties; there 
should be no less rigorous a standard for asserting jurisdiction over plaintiffs than 
over defendants in this context." Id. Consequently, the due process limitations on 
the Proposal's provisions for personal jurisdiction in state courts to which multi- 
forum, multiparty litigation is transferred apply with equal force to both plaintiffs 
and defendants. Thus, for the analytical purposes of this paper all defendant-cen- 
tered language used in the due process cases should be considered to apply with 
equal force to plaintiffs. 
21. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, $ 3.08 a t  147 (footnote 
added). 
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The comments following section 4.01 explain the Proposal's 
reasoning in conferring such expansive jurisdictional power on 
the state transferee court: "[Ilf the court were limited by its 
own long-arm statute, it might not be able to embrace all of the 
elements of the dispersed litigation . . . [and thus] might not be 
able to provide the just and efficient resolution of all the con- 
solidated actions."22 The Proposal thus confers powers upon 
state courts which the state legislature itself may have seen fit 
to withhold fiom the state's courts. 
111. DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS OF THE TERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION OF STATE TRANSFEREE COURTS 
In analyzing the due process issues raised by the 
Proposal's expansion of a state transferee court's territorial 
jurisdiction, this section of the paper will first set forth the due 
process arguments presented in the Proposal to justify such 
expansion. These arguments will then be evaluated. 
A. The Proposal's Due Process Analysis 
The distinction between the due process limits that re- 
strain the assertion of federal judicial power and the limits on 
the states' exercise of judicial power is the basis for the 
Proposal's assertion that the expansion of a state transferee 
court's territorial jurisdiction does not violate the United States 
Constitution. In the comments to section 4.01, the Proposal 
states: 
Nationwide service of process for complex litigation would be 
under the authorization of a federal statute and not simply an 
assertion of state power. Congress has the power to enact 
such a statute as part of its authority over interstate com- 
merce. Thus, jurisdiction under this federal statute would not 
be limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but would be controlled by the Fifth Amendment 
and the power of Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment under Section 5 of that Amendment.23 
In other words, the Proposal asserts that because the source of 
legislation is federal, the FiRh Amendment due process analy- 
sis is more appropriately applied to a state transferee court's 
22. Id. 8 4.01 cmt. f at 193. 
23. Id. 4 4.01 cmt. f at 193-94. 
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exercise of nationwide personal jurisdiction. Application of the 
Fifth Amendment is important because the Supreme Court 
cases which have struck down extraterritorial assertions of 
personal jurisdiction have been based on the limits placed on 
state power by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment .24 
Although the Proposal asserts that a Fifth Amendment due 
process analysis is the appropriate test for determining the 
constitutionality of a state transferee court's exercise of nation- 
wide personal jurisdiction, the Proposal does not specifically 
analyze the restraints that the Fifth Amendment places on the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction by state transferee courts. 
Rather, the Proposal apparently presumes that because juris- 
diction would be provided by a federal statute, the Fifth 
Amendment would place duplicate restrictions on the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction by both federal and state transferee 
courts. Accordingly, the Proposal's due process analysis of the 
personal jurisdictional power of state transferee courts under 
section 4.01, for the most part, merely incorporates the 
Proposal's due process analysis of the personal jurisdictional 
power of federal transferee courts under section 3.08.'~ It is 
therefore necessary to examine the due process analysis provid- 
ed in the comments to section 3.08. 
Comment (e) to section 3.08 appraises the limitations on 
the personal jurisdictional power of the transferee court under 
the Fifth Amendment by drawing analogies from the Supreme 
Court's decisions concerning the Fourteenth Amendment. Such 
comparisons are necessary because the Supreme Court has 
never decided a personal jurisdiction case under the Fifth 
Amendment. It is therefore uncertain how due process limita- 
tions under the Fifth Amendment are to be determined.26 As 
24. Id. a t  194. The comments to § 4.01 also rely on 9 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Amendment's enforcement provision, to justify expansion of state 
jurisdiction. This is neatly done since the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment places demands on state governments which restrict state sovereignty. 
Under the aegis of 5 5 of that amendment, however, the Proposal wishes to ex- 
pand state sovereignty to an unprecedented degree. Section 5 states, "Congress 
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this arti- 
cle." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 5. Whether the Proposal is enforcing "the provi- 
sions of this article [Amendment XIVI" or implementing some other goal is beyond 
the scope of this paper, but the Proposal's reliance on !j 5, a t  least initially, seems 
misplaced. 
25. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, $ 4.01 cmt. f a t  (238-39). 
26. Id. 9 3.08 cmt. e at 156. 
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the Proposal indicates, however, " [t] he analogies are well- 
founded . . . because the relevant language of both amendments 
is identi~al."~' 
Under well-known Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, 
a state may assert personal jurisdiction over a defeedant who 
has "minimum contacts" with the forum state when the asser- 
tion of jurisdiction will not violate traditional notions of "fair 
play and substantial justi~e.'"~ Drawing from the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process analysis, the Proposal concludes that 
"just as an analysis of state contacts and fairness are [sic] per- 
tinent to the decision of whether a particular assertion of juris- 
diction violates the Fourteenth Amendment, reference to na- 
tional contacts and fairness appears to be proper for determin- 
ing whether FiRh Amendment constraints are ~atisfied."~' 
The Proposal thus advances a two-prong test for determining 
whether the transferee court's exercise of personal jurisdiction 
conforms with the due process requirements of the Fifth 
Amendment: (1) national contacts and (2) fairness. These 
prongs will be discussed in turn. 
1. National contacts 
The national contacts prong of the Proposal's Fifth Arnend- 
ment analysis is derived from International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington's pronouncement that for a state to exercise juris- 
27. Id. The pertinent language of both amendments states that no person 
shall be deprived "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. 
CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, $1. 
It  should be noted that the Supreme Court has relied on Fourteenth Amend- 
ment cases to analyze due process constraints on the federal government in areas 
other than personal jurisdiction. For instance, in Mathews v. Eldridge the Supreme 
Court stated: "Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental deci- 
sions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or 'property' interests within the mean- 
ing of the Due Process Clause of the FiRh or Fourteenth Amendment." 424 U.S. 
319, 332 (1976). 
Such precedents provide some support for the Proposal's analogy, but the Unit- 
ed States Supreme Court has applied different standards to state and federal gov- 
ernments in the past. In voting rights cases, for example, the Court has held that 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution imposes a "one-man, one- 
vote principle." See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1963). This principle has been 
applied with virulence to state and local governments. See Avery v. Midland Coun- 
ty, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). This principle of absolute equality in vote strength flies in 
the face of the United States Constitution which allows each state to send two 
Senators to the federal legislative branch regardless of population. 
28. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting 
Milliken V. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
29. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, $ 3.08 cmt. e a t  156. 
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diction over a person, certain "minimum contacts" must exist 
between that state and the person over whom jurisdiction is 
asserted. Extending this concept of "minimum contacts" to its 
Fifth Amendment analysis, the Proposal asserts that due pro- 
cess, in the federal context, requires minimum contacts be- 
tween the United States and the person over whom jurisdiction 
is a~serted.~' 
The Proposal's national contacts test is not new. When 
lower federal courts have tested the constitutionality of federal 
statutes conferring nationwide jurisdiction, national contacts 
have been central to their inquiry. These courts have sustained 
jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant's presence in, or the 
defendant's mere contact with, the United  state^.^' Although 
the full Court has not addressed the issue, two Supreme Court 
Justices have supported federal court jurisdiction on the basis 
of the defendant's presence in, or contacts with, the United 
States.32 In Stafford v. Briggs, the national contacts approach 
was applied by the lower courts to uphold jurisdiction autho- 
rized by the Mandamus and Venue The Supreme Court 
reversed on other grounds, but dissenting Justice Stewart, 
joined by Justice Brennan, addressed the national contacts 
question. Justice Stewart wrote that "due process requires only 
certain minimum contacts between the defendant and the sov- 
ereign that has created the court."34 
In short, based on analogies to International Shoe's Four- 
teenth Amendment analysis, decisions of the lower federal 
courts, and dicta from two retired Supreme Court Justices, the 
Proposal asserts that national contacts is the proper basis for 
asserting personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amend~nent .~~ 
30. Id. a t  157. 
31. See, e.g., Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 
1984); Hogue v. Milodon Eng'g, Inc., 736 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1984); FTC v. Jim 
Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1981). 
32. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 530-33 (1980). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. a t  554 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justices Stewart and Brennan are, 
however, no longer with the Court. 
35. It should be noted, however, that the national contacts approach has only 
been addressed within the context of federal question cases. Nevertheless, the Pro- 
posal concludes that "there is no basis for concluding that the Fifth Amendment 
supports a national-contacts test for nondiversity cases, but that a more limited 
test must be used in diversity cases." COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 
1, at  157 (citing Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Juris- 
diction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 70 (1984)). Furthermore, the 
Proposal argues: 
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2. Fairness 
Among the lower federal courts that have employed a na- 
tional contacts test, there is disagreement about the precise 
standard that should be applied. This disagreement centers on 
whether jurisdiction can be based purely on national contacts 
or whether a fairness requirement must also be ~ a t i s f i e d . ~ ~  
Nevertheless, even courts adopting the "pure" national contacts 
approach have acknowledged that all litigants enjoy the right 
to a fair forum.37 These courts, however, maintain that the 
right to a fair forum is addressed adequately by statutory pro- 
visions regarding venue and transfer.38 
As mentioned, the Proposal has adopted a standard that 
includes both the fairness requirement and the showing of na- 
tional  contact^.^' The reporter's notes to section 3.08 comment 
(e) state that "[gliven the eradication of precise venue limita- 
tions on transfer under this proposal, reliance on national con- 
tacts without a separate fairness inquiry would be question- 
able."40 In the case of state transferee courts the issue of re- 
moving venue and transfer protections is irrelevant because 
federal statutory venue and transfer provisions are not applica- 
ble to state courts. 
Id. 
Complex diversity litigation has all of the characteristics that currently 
justify the national-contacts standard: (1) the need to provide a forum for 
litigation to correct and control severe problems in the national economy 
that are likely to involve parties across the country acting in a similar 
fashion or being injured by similar conduct; (2) the need to provide a 
forum where all parties can be subjected to jurisdiction, when no single 
state has that power; and (3) the need to provide a convenient forum for 
litigation to marshall and conserve the assets of an insolvent party. 
Nevertheless, the appropriateness of a national contacts test for nondiversity 
cases remains uncertain. 
36. Id. 5 3.08 reporter's note to cmt. e (lo), at  157-58. For cases which have 
employed a "puren national contacts approach in their Fifth Amendment analysis, 
see Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1984); Hogue v. 
Milodon Eng'g, Inc., 736 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1984); FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 
F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1981). Cases which have articulated a fairness requirement in 
addition to a showing of national contacts include Handley v. Indiana & Mich. 
Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir. 1984) and Home v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 
255 (3d Cir. 1982). 
37. See, e.g., Trans-Asiatic Oil, 743 F.2d 956; Hogue, 736 F.2d 989; Jim Wal- 
ter Corp., 651 F.2d 251. 
38. Id. 
39. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, 5 3.08 cmt. e a t  157. See 
also supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
40. Id. reporter's notes to cmt. e (10) a t  158 (citation omitted). 
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The factors contemplated by the Proposal in determining 
whether a transferee court's assertion of personal jurisdiction 
over a litigant is fair can be derived from comment (f) to sec- 
tion 3.08, "Application of the proposed standard."" According 
to comment (f), the Complex Litigation Panel should balance 
two factors in determining whether exercise of personal juris- 
diction by the transferee court is fair: (1) the actual hardship or 
inconvenience imposed on a particular party and (2) the "sys- 
temic interests and need to provide a conclusive adjudication 
for all of the litigants."42 Comment (f) does not indicate the 
relative weight the Complex Litigation Panel should give each 
factor, although it does acknowledge that it may be egregiously 
unfair to force "a truly local party" to litigate in a distant court, 
thereby leaving the litigant without remedy if he or she refuses 
(or is unable) to travel cross-country to vindicate legitimate 
rights.43 The Proposal, however, does grant the Complex Liti- 
gation Panel the authority to exempt litigants from having 
their cases sent to the transferee forum whenever "fairness 
concerns so r e q ~ i r e . " ~  
B. Analysis of the Proposal's Fifih Amendment National 
Contacts and Fairness Test as Applied to 
State Transferee Courts 
Having examined the Proposal's Fifth Amendment analysis 
and its rationale for applying such analysis to the exercise of 
nationwide personal jurisdiction by a state transferee court, 
this paper will next examine the appropriateness of applying 
the Proposal's Fifth Amendment analysis to state transferee 
courts. 
1. National contacts 
As previously noted, the Proposal asserts that the Fifth 
Amendment's national contacts analysis is properly applied to 
state transferee courts because they will be exercising nation- 
wide personal jurisdiction under the authority of federal legis- 
l a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Some support for this assertion can perhaps be found 
41. Id. cmt. f at 158. 
42. Id. at 159. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 160. 
45. See supra part 1II.A. 
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in World- Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. W o ~ d s o n . ~ ~  In 
Volkswagen the Supreme Court stated that the concept of mini- 
mum contacts 
perform[s] two related, but distinguishable, functions. It  pro- 
tects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a 
distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the 
States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond limits 
imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a 
federal system." 
If restrictions on state power are at  the core of the mini- 
mum contacts requirement of the Due Process Clause, then the 
source of legislation under which a state is acting would seem 
critical. As the Proposal recognizes, "the Volkswagen Court's 
concern about possible friction between coequal sovereigns is 
inapplicable when the state tribunal is acting under authority 
granted by C~ngress."~ Without the concern about possible 
friction between coequal sovereigns, it is arguable that the 
minimum contacts analysis need not be restricted to state 
boundaries. Thus, when states are acting under authority 
granted by Congress, a national contacts approach to a due 
process analysis may be appropriate. 
Nevertheless, the significance of the Due Process Clause in 
restricting state power was questioned in Insurance Corp. of 
Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee: 
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World- 
Wide Volkswagen Corp. . . . must be seen as ultimately a 
h c t i o n  of the individual liberty interest preserved by the 
Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the 
personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes 
no mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the feder- 
alism concept operated as an independent restriction on the 
sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive 
the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions 
cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the indi- 
vidual can subject himself to powers from which he may oth- 
erwise be protected." 
46. 444 U.S. 286 (1986). 
47. Id. at 291-92. 
48. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, 94.01. cmt. f at 194. 
49. 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982). 
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If restrictions on state power are, as Bauxites implies, only 
tangential to the minimum contacts requirement of the Due 
Process Clause, then the source of legislation under which a 
state is acting would seem to be of limited importance. Thus, 
even when states are acting under authority granted by Con- 
gress, state boundaries may still be significant in a minimum 
contacts analysis. 
Additional questions concerning the appropriateness of 
applying a national contacts analysis to the state court's exer- 
cise of nationwide personal jurisdiction are raised in cases and 
literature addressing the application of a national contacts 
approach to questions of federal court jurisdiction. According to 
some lower courts and commentators, the Due Process Clause 
permits courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over any defen- 
dant who is located within or has minimum contacts with the 
government responsible for creating the court.50 The Proposal 
itself quotes Supreme Court language which indicates that due 
process requires contacts with the government responsible for 
creating the court: "[Dlue process requires only certain mini- 
mum contacts between the [defendant] and the sovereign that 
has created the court."51 
If contacts with the government responsible for creating 
the court is the proper due process analysis, then, while mini- 
mum contacts with the United States may be sufficient to sup- 
port a federal court's exercise of nationwide personal jurisdic- 
tion, it is not sufficient to support a state court's exercise of 
such power. Thus, the Proposal's application of a national con- 
tacts analysis to the state transferee court's exercise of person- 
al jurisdiction may be improper. Although the state courts 
would be acting under the auspices of the federal government, 
such courts are still the creation of state governments and not 
of the federal government. 
50. See, e.g., Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816 (6th Cir. 1981) 
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 
1979); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub 
nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 US. 527 (1980); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138 
(2d Cir. 1974). See also Thomas F. Green, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction in Personam of 
Corporations and Due Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967 (1960-61); Note, Alien Corpo- 
ration and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Jurisdictional Standard, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 470. 
51. Stafford, 444 US. at  554 (Stewart, J., dissenting), quoted in COMPLEX 
LITIGATION PROPOSAL, 4 3.08, reporter's notes to cmt. e (lo), at  158. 
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It  could be argued that because state transferee courts 
would assert nationwide jurisdiction under the authorization of 
a federal statute, the state transferee courts would assume the 
nature of federally created fora making nationwide contacts the 
appropriate personal jurisdiction analysis. Nevertheless, the 
Proposal does not envision the state transferee court being co- 
opted into the federal judiciary system. 
Comment (f) to section 4.01 states that the "state judge 
handling consolidation proceedings under section 4.01 contin- 
ues to sit as a state j~dge."'~ State transferee judges must 
continue to sit as state judges because "Congress could not ef- 
fectively confer Article I11 authority in this context because 
most state judges do not have life-time tenure and the other 
attributes of the federal judi~iary."'~ Furthermore, "[allthough 
Congress might designate state transferee courts as Article I 
courts, that might be deemed to conflict with various state 
constitutional provisions prohibiting judges from serving in 
incompatible offices, thereby effectively preventing judges from 
those states from serving as transferee courts."54 Thus, even if 
the Proposal did seek to conscript state judges for federal ser- 
vice, state court judges would be prevented from serving the 
federal system by the federal constitution and in many cases by 
individual state constitutions. 
Since state courts are the creation of state governments, 
regardless of the source of legislation under which the state 
court operates, the pertinent forum for a due process analysis 
of a state court's exercise of personal jurisdiction may well be 
the state in which the court is located. Under a state contacts 
analysis, litigants would need minimum contacts with the state 
in which the state transferee court sits in order to meet the due 
process requirements of either the Fourteenth or the Fifth 
Amendment. 
Thus far, only one commentator has addressed the appro- 
priateness of the Proposal's nationwide contacts analysis for 
determining the constitutionality of a state transferee court's 
exercise of personal jurisdiction. Joan Steinman argues against 
a national contacts analysis: 
52. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, 5 4.01 cmt. f at 192. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
10 191 NATIONWIDE PERSONAL JURISDICTION 1033 
"[Tlhe question is whether the polity, whose power the court 
wields, possesses a legitimate claim to exercise force over the 
defendant" (quoting Marryellen Fullerton, Constitutional 
Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal 
Courts 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 15 (1984)). However, state govern- 
ments, not the federal government, create state courts. Thus, 
it is the state that must possess a legitimate basis for exercis- 
ing personal jurisdiction. The power of the United States to 
subject those within its borders or those who have minimum 
contacts with the nation to jurisdiction in any of its courts is 
irrelevant. While, "[als far as exercise of the federal judicial 
power is concerned, state boundaries are given no significance 
by the Constitution," when it comes to federal legislative pow- 
er concerning state judicial power, state boundaries have 
constitutional significance. Regardless of who is doing the 
legislating, the relevant boundaries are those of the sovereign 
that has created the court (quoting Lisak v. Mercantil 
Bankcorp, 34 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987), cert denied sub 
nom. Lisak v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988)). 
The state is the entity with which defendants must have 
contact.55 
Steinman's view is by no means conclusive. Nevertheless, 
it suggests that the national contacts prong of the Proposal's 
Fifth Amendment analysis is of questionable application within 
the context of a state transferee court's exercise of nationwide 
personal jurisdiction. 
2. Fairness 
In applying the Proposal's Fifth Amendment fairness stan- 
dard, section 3.08's comment (f) employs factors resembling 
those currently used to evaluate "fair play" in the Fourteenth 
Amendment cases.56 First, comment (f) stresses the need to 
measure the actual hardship or inconvenience imposed on a 
particular litigant.57 This examination of the hardship on or 
inconvenience to a litigant reflects the Fourteenth Amendment 
analysis of the burden on the defendant.58 
Second, comment (f) also appears to require that the hard- 
ship or inconvenience on the litigants be balanced against the 
55. Steinman, supra note 4, at 1119. 
56. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, at 158. 
57. Id. at 159-60. 
58. See World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson., 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
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"systemic interests and need to provide a conclusive adjudica- 
tion for all the  litigant^."^' Similarly, Fourteenth Amendment 
due process analysis as explicated by the Supreme Court bal- 
ances the burden placed on the defendant against the interests 
of the other parties to the litigation and of the judicial system 
itself. More explicitly, the Court's due process analysis weighs 
the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective 
relief, the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the 
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most effi- 
cient resolution of disputes, and the states' shared interest in 
furthering substantive social policies.60 
Comparing the factors applied in the Proposal's fairness 
inquiry and those factors currently used to evaluate whether 
the assertion of jurisdiction conforms to "traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice" in Fourteenth Amendment 
cases,61 it is questionable whether any substantial difference 
exists between the two tests. The only factor the Proposal im- 
plies which may be significantly divergent between Fourteenth 
Amendment cases and those falling within the purview of the 
Proposal is the role played by state boundaries in determining 
the hardship or burden placed on the litigant.62 
Comment (f) to section 3.08 asserts that "state boundaries 
cannot be used as a proxy for fairness in the Fifth Amendment 
context; crossing state boundaries does not accurately measure 
the practical degree of hardship or inconvenience to litigants 
because their circumstances may be so different."63 This com- 
ment seems to imply that state boundaries are only important 
in evaluating the burden on the defendant in Fourteenth 
Amendment cases. 
Nevertheless, if minimum contacts with the state in which 
the transferee court is located are required to justify the exer- 
cise of personal jurisdiction by state transferee courts, the 
Proposal's argument that state boundaries are not determina- 
tive in assessing fairness under the Fifth Amendment may be 
moot. At least within the context of section 4.01, then, the 
Proposal's fairness prong would be practically indistinguishable 
59. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, $3.08 cmt. f at 159. 
60. World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. 
61. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
62. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, at 160. 
63. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, $3.08 cmt. f at 160. 
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from the criteria currently used to evaluate "fair play" in Four- 
teenth Amendment cases. 
As previously noted, the Proposal's argument that national 
contacts can sustain nationwide personal jurisdiction under a 
Fifth Amendment due process analysis may not apply in the 
context of state transferee courts because state courts are the 
creation of state  government^.^^ If national contacts cannot 
sustain state transferee jurisdiction, litigants who do not fkeely 
consent to the jurisdiction of an alien court must have the 
requisite minimum contacts with the state in which the trans- 
feree court sits to be subject to that forum. In short, state 
transferee court jurisdiction would be subject to the same Four- 
teenth Amendment minimum as state court jurisdiction gen- 
erally. In addition, state transferee court jurisdiction would 
have to satisfy the Fifth Amendment fairness analysis, which, 
as we have seen,65 is essentially equivalent to the Fourteenth 
Amendment fair play analysis that non-transferee state court 
jurisdiction also must satisfy. Thus, if nationwide contacts are 
not an appropriate indicator of state transferee jurisdiction, 
state transferee courts, in exercising personal jurisdiction, will 
be subject to the same due process requirements that the Four- 
teenth Amendment imposes on all state courts. 
Given the facts that Fourteenth Amendment due process 
limitations may apply to state transferee courts' exercise of 
personal jurisdiction, it becomes necessary to examine whether 
any state consolidation provisions (such as that exemplified by 
section 4.01) can actually be a viable part of this (or any other) 
complex litigation statute. The Proposal asserts that "state 
transferee courts can be true partners in handling complex lit- 
igation only if they are able to exert the same nationwide juris- 
diction as do their federal  counterpart^."^^ Nevertheless, this 
part of the paper will argue that a federal-to-state consolidation 
provision such as section 4.01 of the Proposal remains a useful 
tool for the efficient adjudication of multiforum, multiparty liti- 
64. See supra part 1II.B. 
65. See supra part III.B.2. 
66. Id. $4.01, cmt. f at 193. 
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gation even if state transferee courts lack nationwide personal 
jurisdiction. 
A. A Significant Number of Related Federal Cases Will Be 
Eligible for Transfer to State Court 
One of the purposes of section 4.01 federal-to-state consoli- 
dation is to promote judicial efficiency by reducing, and if possi- 
ble, eliminating the duplication of effort that is inevitable in 
the independent prosecution of parallel state and federal 
claims.67 Not all related federal cases must be consolidated in 
order to reduce such duplicative effort. Thus, "[elven if it is 
determined that a particular litigant should not be required to 
participate in the consolidated proceeding, that conclusion does 
not inevitably require that the consolidated resolution of the 
dispute be aband~ned."~~ Nevertheless, the usefulness of sec- 
tion 4.01 is, at  least to some degree, dependent on the ability to 
transfer a sufficient portion of the cases lodged in federal 
courts to the state transferee court to achieve a meaningfbl 
reduction in judicial redundancy. 
In calculating the proportion of federal cases that will 
generally be amenable to consolidation in a state transferee 
court, it is important to consider the two types of federal cases 
that will exist: (1) cases in which the transferee state court 
could exercise jurisdiction over all the  litigant^,^^ but for the 
fact that one of the parties opted for a federal forum; and (2) 
cases in which the transferee state court could not exercise 
jurisdiction over all the litigants. The first category of federal 
cases are capable of being consolidated in the state transferee 
forum, while the second category of federal cases is not consti- 
tutionally transferrable to the state court if the state transferee 
court cannot assert nationwide personal jurisdiction. Thus, in 
determining the proportion of federal cases that will generally 
be susceptible to consolidation in a state transferee court, it is 
necessary to know the ratio of cases falling within the first 
category to cases falling within the second category. 
67. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, Ch. 3, Introductory 
Note at 36-37. 
68. Id. 93.08 cmt. f at 159. 
69. In addition to being limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the territorial jurisdiction of a state court can be limited by its own 
long-arm statute. See id. at 150. For the purpose of analysis, however, this paper 
will only look at limits imposed by the Constitution, not those imposed on a court 
by the state itself. 
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Under section 4.01 of the Proposal, a federal-to-state trans- 
fer will only be appropriate when "the events giving rise to the 
controversy are centered in a single state and a significant 
portion of the existing litigation is lodged in the courts of that 
state."?' When events and parties are concentrated in a single 
state, it would seem that cases fitting in the first category of 
federal cases would be prevalent, because minimum contacts 
would likely exist between the litigants and the state forum. 
For example, in the cases arising from the 1981 collapse of the 
Hyatt Skywalk in Kansas City, those injured or killed were 
obviously present in Missouri a t  the time of the accident. Those 
not residents of the state likely had some minimum contacts 
with Missouri which brought them to the area. Furthermore, 
most, if not all, of the defendants were subject to Missouri's 
jurisdiction because they were defending themselves in the 
significant portion of the existing litigation already lodged in 
the courts of M i s ~ o u r i . ~ ~  
It  follows that in most multiparty, multiforum litigation 
falling within the ambit of section 4.01 a significant portion of 
the related federal cases will be capable of consolidation in the 
state transferee court. Consequently, section 4.01 should allow 
a meaningful reduction in the duplicative adjudication of paral- 
lel state and federal claims. 
B. Cooperative Adjudication of Transferable and 
Nontransferable Section 4.01 Cases 
In addition to reducing duplicative adjudication of parallel 
state and federal claims by transferring a significant portion of 
related federal cases to a state transferee court, section 4.01's 
provisions for consolidation to state courts could reduce the 
ultimate costs of adjudicating those federal cases 
which-because of due process restraints-are not capable of 
being transferred to the state forum. 
With most cases consolidated in the state transferee court, 
cooperation between the state forum and the federal forum(s) 
adjudicating the nontransferable cases is not only highly likely, 
but also preferable, and, in fact, indispensable. For example, 
after transfemng as many of the cases as possible to the state 
70. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, 54.01 (a)(l) at 17. 
71. See David R. Morris & Andrew See, The Hyatt Skywalk Litigation: The 
Plaintiffs' Perspective, 52 UMKC L. REV. 246 (1984). 
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court under section 4.01, the Complex Litigation Panel could 
consolidate the remaining federal cases in the federal district 
court in the district in which the state transferee court sits.72 
A transfer in tandem would allow the state and federal judges 
to coordinate the litigation through, for example, joint pretrial 
 conference^,?^ joint d is~overy ,~~ and even joint trial.75 Such 
coordination reduces the negative impact of duplicative adjudi- 
cation on both litigants and on the American judicial system. 
The ALI's Complex Litigation Project's proposal to grant 
state transferee courts nationwide personal jurisdiction is of 
dubious constitutionality. The theories which support a federal 
court's exercise of nationwide personal jurisdiction may not 
apply within the context of state courts-even when jurisdic- 
tion is supposedly derived from a federal statute. 
Even though a state transferee court may not be able to 
constitutionally exercise nationwide personal jurisdiction, how- 
ever, the federal-to-state transfer provisions of the Complex 
Litigation Project would still serve as a useful tool in reducing 
the duplication of effort that unavoidably occurs in the inde- 
pendent adjudication of parallel state and federal claims. Many 
of the single event disaster multiforum, multiparty cases filed 
in federal court that have related cases that were brought in 
state courts should be transferable to a state court--due pro- 
72. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 1, $ 3.01 for the 
Proposal's provisions for federal-to-federal consolidation. See also George T. Conway, 
111, The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 YALE L.J. 1099, 
1111 (1987) (making the argument of tandem transfer in connection with a pro- 
posal to amend 28 U.S.C. $1407 to allow the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga- 
tion to transfer cases both to and from state courts). 
The question may be (and probably should be) posed as to why, given the 
possible inability to consolidate all of the related litigation in the state transferee 
forum, should not all such multiforum cases with multiple parties be consolidated 
into the federal system. Presumably, in consideration of the factors for designating 
a state court as a transferee forum for federal action, see supra part 11, the state, 
not the federal, court is the preferable forum for adjudication of claims asserted 
under state law. 
73. Conway, supra note 72, a t  1111. 
74. In the Hyatt Skywalk litigation the federal district court and the state 
court cooperated extensively to facilitate "a massive bointl discovery effort." 
Conway, a t  1111 (quoting David R. Morris & Andrew See, The Hyatt Skywalk 
Litigation: The Plaintiffs' Perspective, 52 UMKC L. REV. 246, 254 (1984)). 
75. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND, which suggests that "con- 
sideration . . . be given to a joint trial, a t  which separate state and federal juries 
would sit . . . and hear evidence." $31.31, 11.53 at  261 (1985). 
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cess limitations notwithstanding. Furthermore, even those 
cases filed in federal courts but not transferable to the state 
forum because of the state forum's lack of personal jurisdiction 
can still be effectively coordinated with the state transferee 
court, thereby achieving the major efficiency aim of the pro- 
posed complex litigation law. 
Deborah Dunn 
